By Dr. Sulaiman Abdulwahab Sulaiman, CNA

The significance of the Supreme Court judgment goes beyond the political fortunes of one individual. Its implications extend to any aspirant or candidate who finds himself or herself in circumstances similar to those now being questioned in the Nasarawa SDP case.
The Supreme Court has restored Sections 77(5), 77(6) and 77(7) of the Electoral Act 2026. Section 77(5) provides that only persons whose names are contained in a political party’s membership register submitted to INEC at least 21 days before a primary, congress or convention are eligible to participate in the exercise. Section 77(6) requires the party to use the register submitted to INEC, while Section 77(7) provides a consequence where the party fails to submit its register within the prescribed period.
The implication is significant. A politician cannot simply join a political party after its statutory membership register has been submitted to INEC and assume that subsequent membership automatically gives him or her the right to participate in a primary conducted under that register. Where the law requires the party to use the register already submitted to INEC, the candidate’s eligibility must be considered against the statutory requirements applicable to that particular exercise.
This has implications for political defectors who leave one party after its primary and subsequently seek nomination under another party, particularly where they were not members of the second party at the time its relevant membership register was submitted to INEC.
The same principle applies to any political party that attempts to replace a previously nominated candidate. The replacement process does not exist in a legal vacuum. Section 33 of the Electoral Act 2026 provides that, where a candidate withdraws or dies, the affected party must, within 14 days of the occurrence, conduct another primary to produce and submit a replacement candidate to INEC.
Consequently, a candidate emerging from a replacement primary conducted outside the statutory period may face a legal question about the validity of the process through which he or she obtained the party’s ticket. The question would depend on the particular facts, including the date and legal effect of the withdrawal, the date of the replacement primary and the applicable statutory provisions. This is why the Supreme Court ruling is potentially far-reaching.
Supreme Court ruling reinforces the principle that party nomination is not merely an internal political affair when the Electoral Act has prescribed mandatory statutory conditions governing membership registers, primaries and candidate nomination.
Implications for Defectors
The judgment is particularly relevant to politicians who change political parties after losing or failing to secure their preferred nomination. A candidate who loses a primary in Party A, subsequently joins Party B and seeks Party B’s ticket cannot assume that joining the second party is, by itself, sufficient to satisfy every statutory requirement for participation in Party B’s primary.
The critical questions include: Was the person a member of Party B when its relevant membership register was submitted to INEC? Was the person’s name contained in that register? Was the primary conducted using the register required by Section 77? Was the person legally entitled to participate in the primary under the applicable provisions of the Electoral Act?
These questions are now more consequential because the Supreme Court has upheld the validity of the statutory membership-register provisions.
Implications for Replacement Candidates
The judgment also has implications for candidates who emerge through replacement primaries. Where a party’s original candidate withdraws, the party cannot simply treat the withdrawal as an opportunity to select another candidate whenever it chooses. Section 33 establishes a statutory framework for replacement.
Thus, where the facts show that: a candidate withdrew on a particular date; the law required a replacement primary within 14 days; but the party conducted the replacement primary substantially later; the legality of the resulting nomination may become null and void.
The candidate who emerges from such a process may therefore face a legal challenge – not necessarily because of anything personally done by the candidate, but because the validity of a candidacy depends partly upon the legality of the process through which the candidate was nominated.
This distinction is important. A candidate may have won a primary by the required votes, affirmation or consensus and still face a legal question about whether the party had complied with the statutory requirements for conducting that primary.

Implications for Political Parties
The Supreme Court judgment equally places a greater responsibility on political parties. Parties must pay close attention to:
the accuracy and completeness of their membership registers;
the statutory deadline for submitting those registers to INEC;
the use of the correct register during primaries, congresses and conventions;
the statutory period for replacing a candidate who withdraws or dies;
the required notice to INEC before conducting a primary; and
the documentation supporting any withdrawal, substitution or replacement.
The lesson is straightforward: political parties cannot afford procedural uncertainty when selecting candidates for elective office.
The judgment has implications for every prospective candidate who changes parties after a membership register has been submitted to INEC and for every party that seeks to replace a candidate after a withdrawal. The lesson is straightforward: political parties cannot treat statutory timelines as administrative details to be adjusted at convenience.
Therefore, a nomination process that appears politically successful may subsequently become legally vulnerable if mandatory statutory requirements were not followed.
Implications for INEC
The judgment also reinforces the importance of INEC’s regulatory role. The Commission is not merely a passive recipient of names submitted by political parties. The Electoral Act establishes statutory procedures governing what parties must submit, when they must submit it and how party nomination exercises are to be conducted.
However, the presence of INEC officials at a primary should not automatically be interpreted as a judicial certification that every aspect of the party’s internal process complied with the law.
Ultimately, where a dispute reaches the courts, the question remains whether the statutory requirements were satisfied.
Why This Matters Beyond Nasarawa
This is why the Supreme Court judgment should not be viewed solely through the prism of the 2027 Nasarawa governorship contest. The principle potentially affects every political party, every aspirant and every candidate operating under similar circumstances across Nigeria.
Consider a hypothetical situation in which an aspirant loses the primary of Party A, joins Party B after Party B has submitted its membership register to INEC and subsequently participates in a Party B primary. Under the restored Section 77 framework, questions would arise concerning the aspirant’s eligibility to participate in that primary.
Similarly, if a party’s candidate withdraws and the party conducts a replacement primary outside the statutory period prescribed by Section 33, the replacement candidate could face questions about the legality of the nomination process.
The Supreme Court judgment therefore sends a broader message: electoral deadlines and statutory nomination requirements are not merely administrative suggestions. Where the law makes compliance mandatory, political parties and aspirants must take them seriously.
A Setback, But Not a Personal Judgment against Adamu
This broader implication also helps explain precisely why the Supreme Court judgment constitutes a setback for former IGP Adamu without misrepresenting what the Court decided.
The Supreme Court did not declare Adamu disqualified. It did not order INEC to remove his name from the ballot. It did not determine the validity of the SDP’s 5 September replacement primary. What the Court did was restore the statutory provisions against which the validity of IGP Adamu’s nomination processes becomes null and void.
The same legal reasoning would apply to any other candidate in Nigeria who finds himself or herself in materially similar circumstances. That is the real significance of the judgment.
Conclusion
By restoring Sections 77(5), 77(6), 77(7) and 84(2) of the Electoral Act 2026, the apex court has reaffirmed the statutory importance of party membership registers and the legal framework governing candidate nomination.
For IGP Adamu, that restoration matters because his emergence as the SDP candidate occurred after the party had already submitted its membership register and after its original governorship primary had produced another candidate. It also occurred following the reported withdrawal of that candidate and a replacement primary held considerably later. With the Supreme Court rulling, IGP Adamu’s stand as SDP governorship candidate becomes null and void.
The Supreme Court has therefore reinforced a principle that should concern every political party and aspirant preparing for the 2027 elections:
Political ambition may determine who wants to contest and political parties may determine whom they wish to sponsor – but the validity of the nomination must ultimately conform to the law. For former IGP Adamu, that is where the Supreme Court ruling becomes a setback.

Dr. Sulaiman Abdulwahab Sulaiman, CNA,
FACSA (USA), FCIFCN, FCIM, FICAN, FICEN
Former Executive Secretary, Nasarawa State Scholarship Board
26TH September, 2026