By Justice Abdullahi Liman

The article referenced makes several strong claims about indigeneity in Nasarawa State and the broader Middle Belt, using a 1800-era map of “Hausaland” (sourced from Boyd & Mack, 1995) to argue that Hausa and Fulani peoples were exclusively settlers who arrived mostly during or after Usman dan Fodio’s Sokoto Jihad (1804–1808), primarily for trade or conquest. It denies significant pre-Jihad cultural, religious, commercial, and economic intercourse with local ethnic groups (Gbagyi, Eggon, Alago, Koro, etc.) and dismisses large-scale movements or settlements by Kanuri, Fulani, Hausa, or Nupe peoples for reasons beyond trade. It also questions the pre-colonial, pre-Jihad origins of towns like Lafia, Nasarawa, Keffi, Awe, Wase, and Azara.
While the core assertion—that the major Hausa city-states (the “Hausaland” of the seven kingdoms plus allies) did not politically encompass the Nasarawa area pre-Jihad—is broadly accurate based on the map and standard historiography, the piece contains historical fallacies in its broader denials. These oversimplify complex, layered migrations and longstanding interconnections that predate the Jihad by centuries. History in the Middle Belt is one of fluid movements, trade diasporas, pastoral expansions, and cultural exchanges—not a rigid “indigenous vs. immigrant” binary. No major ethnic group in Nigeria lacks migration stories; indigeneity claims often reflect later political narratives rather than absolute aboriginal status.

1. Established Pre-Jihad Cultural, Religious, Commercial, and Economic Intercourse
   Hausa states (Kano, Katsina, Zazzau, etc.) maintained extensive long-distance trade networks across West Africa for centuries before 1804. These routes linked the Sahel to the Benue River valley and central Nigeria (the future Nasarawa/Plateau/Benue areas) through commerce in salt, kola nuts, leather goods, cloth, slaves, and ivory. Hausa merchants (often Muslim) established semi-permanent trading quarters (sabon gari or zango) in non-Hausa territories, fostering linguistic and cultural exchange. Hausa became a lingua franca in many market towns due to these interactions, not just post-Jihad conquest.
   Islam itself spread gradually into parts of the Middle Belt via traders, clerics (including Wangarawa from the west and influences from Bornu), and scholars well before the Jihad. This was not mass conversion or political domination but organic through commerce and intermarriage. Nupe Kingdom (a major pre-Jihad power in central Nigeria) had its own Muslim influences and interactions with Hausa networks. Kanem-Bornu Empire (Kanuri) exerted southward trade and occasional political influence, including contacts with Kwararafa (Jukun) confederacy and other groups. These ties were economic and cultural, not “Hausa political authority” as the article frames the denial—exactly as the post notes that neighbors like Nupe, Gbagyi, Eggon, etc., remained distinct. The Jihad amplified and Islamized these existing networks, but did not create them from nothing.
2. Large-Scale Movements and Migrations Beyond Trade
   The article limits pre-Jihad movements to “trade” while denying others. This ignores well-documented pastoral Fulani migrations. Fulani (Fulbe) pastoralists had been moving southward from the Senegambia/Futa Toro region into Hausaland and beyond for grazing lands since at least the 15th–16th centuries—centuries before dan Fodio. They settled in pockets across the Middle Belt for ecological reasons (tsetse fly zones, seasonal pastures), often in symbiotic (if sometimes tense) relations with farming communities. Some intermarried with locals or Hausa. These were demographic movements, not mere transient traders.
   Kanuri migrations from Bornu southward occurred due to dynastic disputes, droughts, or border expansions under earlier Mais. Nupe groups also had interactions and movements into adjacent areas. These were not “large-scale invasions” but incremental settlements that predated the Jihad’s political upheavals.
3. Pre-Jihad Establishment of Towns by Kanuri, Fulani, Hausa, and Nupe Influences
   The article asks rhetorically what explains towns like Lafia, Nasarawa, Keffi, Awe, Wase, and Azara if they predate the Jihad and colonial era. Historical records provide clear answers:
4. Lafia (Lafian Barebari): Founded in the late 18th century (pre-1804) by Muhammadu Dunama, a Kanuri (Beri-Beri) migrant from the Kanem-Bornu Empire. It was established on the site of an earlier small Koro (Migili/Arago) village south of Shabu. Lafia became a chiefdom with Kanuri ruling houses (e.g., Kofar Kaura and Angwan Doka lineages). British recognition of an emir came later (1903), but the town’s founding and Kanuri presence were pre-Jihad. This directly counters claims of purely post-Jihad arrival.
5. Keffi: Founded circa 1800–1802 by Fulani warrior Abdu Zanga (Abdullahi), from northern origins (linked to Katsina/Zaria), as a vassal emirate to Zaria. This was on the cusp of the Jihad but predates its full impact in the area; it reflects pre-existing Fulani warrior/trader presence.
6. Nasarawa town: Founded later (~1838) by Umaru (a dissident from Keffi with Katsina ties) in Afo (Eloyi) territory—post-Jihad expansion of the emirate system.
7. Awe, Azara, Wase, and smaller communities: Colonial-era accounts (e.g., Hogben 1930) note early foundations or settlements linked to northern migrants (Kanuri, Hausa, or Fulani precursors) in the late 18th/early 19th centuries, often on or near local village sites before full Jihad consolidation. Some were temporary or displaced later. These reflect the same pre-Jihad migratory and trade dynamics, not pure post-1804 creation. Wase, for instance, has Fulani links tied to Bauchi expansions around the Jihad era but built on earlier contacts.
   These towns were often founded on or near existing indigenous settlements (Koro, Afo, Eggon, Alago lands), leading to layered histories of interaction, displacement, or coexistence—common across pre-colonial Africa.

Conclusion:
The map accurately depicts core “Hausaland” pre-Jihad and the distinct identities of neighbors like the Nupe, Gbagyi, Eggon, etc. Civilizations such as Nok and Kwararafa were indeed independent. The Jihad did bring political conquest, new emirates (Keffi, Lafia, Nasarawa under Sokoto vassalage), and accelerated Islamization/settlement. “Hausa-Fulani” as a fused socio-cultural category largely solidified post-Jihad through intermarriage and shared governance, though Hausa and Fulani remained distinct in many contexts.
However, denying pre-19th century intercourse, non-trade migrations, and specific pre-Jihad settlements (e.g., Kanuri Lafia, Fulani pastoral outposts, Hausa trade communities) is a fallacy. These connections were real and documented in trade records, oral histories, and colonial ethnographies. The Middle Belt has always been a zone of migration and exchange; most groups, including those labeled “indigenous,” have origin stories involving movement from elsewhere (e.g., Eggon from Kwararafa areas).
This is not about denying anyone’s political rights today—Nigeria’s constitution addresses citizenship and residency separately from historical indigeneity debates. It is about accurate history: pre-Jihad realities involved more than the article allows. Analogies to Sunak or Badenoch highlight personal pride in origins without negating belonging; the same applies here. For deeper reading, consult works like Hogben’s The Muhammadan Emirates of Nigeria, Britannica entries on these towns, or studies on West African trade diasporas. History is complex—let’s engage it fully rather than selectively.